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Executive summary
Over 800 million people worldwide have no access to electricity. A staggering 86% of them 
live in countries classified as fragile by the OECD, settings characterised by conflict, lack of 
security, weak government capacity, and divided societies. Increasingly, climate change and 
environmental destruction are also driving fragility across the world.
Poor energy access in fragile 
contexts impedes development, 
traps people in extreme poverty, 
and creates structural conditions 
for the persistence of conflict and 
social, political, and economic 
instability. Fragility affects not only 
those living in these countries – it 
drives the global challenges of 
mass migration, terrorism, and 
trafficking that impact us all. 
As we aspire to build back more 
resiliently and inclusively post 
COVID-19, we cannot neglect 
those living in the world’s most 
challenging places. Investing in 
energy access in these contexts 
is critical to power the economic 
opportunities needed to support 
recovery, lift people out of poverty, 
and enable these countries to 
escape fragility.
Although overseas development 
assistance (ODA) spending in 
developing countries on energy 
has been increasing over time, 
it has persistently favoured and 
become increasingly skewed 
towards non-fragile settings. In 
2018, spending on energy in non-
fragile settings was nearly double 
that in fragile settings and almost 
four times higher than in extremely 
fragile locations. This is reflective, 
in part, of the higher uncertainty 
and risks associated with investing 
in fragile settings.
However, if we are to succeed in 
global efforts to achieve universal 
energy access and reduce 
poverty and inequality, we need 
to overcome the challenges of 
energy investments in fragile 
contexts. A new approach is 
needed: one that brings together 
a range of stakeholders to scale 
up investments in energy solutions 
that work in fragile contexts.
Fragile contexts need energy 
solutions that are resilient in the 
face of conflict and uncertainty, 
and are also affordable and 
environmentally sustainable. 
Distributed or off-grid systems 
hold much potential as they are 
modular and disperse risk, making 
them less vulnerable to the single 
point of failure risks associated 
with large-scale centralised 
projects. 
Distributed generation systems 
also lend themselves to use of 
renewable energy sources. Cost 
reductions in renewable energy 
technologies mean that they are 
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now the most affordable off-grid 
energy option in most instances. 
Whereas previously fragile contexts 
could not afford to go green, 
now they cannot afford not to. 
Importantly, for the first time, we 
also have a convergence in what 
is good for the climate, what 
is needed to unlock economic 
growth in fragile states, and what is 
technologically feasible. 
We have the technology needed to 
achieve universal energy access; 
now, we need to unlock financing 
mechanisms to make this a reality. 
New commitments from and 
partnerships between a range of 
stakeholders are needed; national 
governments, donors, development 
finance institutions, and the private 
sector all have key contributions 
to make. Financing facilities 
from multilateral, bilateral, and 
philanthropic donors and innovative 
financing instruments should be 
scaled up to crowd in greater 
private investment. Additionally, the 
governments of fragile states have 
an important enabling role, including 
in creating environments more 
conducive to investment in their 
countries. 
Never has expanding energy access 
in fragile contexts been more 
urgent – and never has it been more 
attainable. A concerted effort from 
all partners is needed to realise this 
goal.
Yemeni vendors use 
lanterns to light their stalls 
at a market in the capital 
Sana’a on April 18, 2015 
on the sixth day of a power 
outage across the country. 
Photo: Mohammed Huwais/
AFP via Getty Images
4 — STATE FRAGILITY INITIATIVE
1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has deeply exacerbated vulnerabilities in the world’s 
most fragile settings. In the context of a global opportunity to build back better 
post-COVID-19 through shifting to a more resilient and sustainable growth path, 
the International Growth Centre’s Council on State Fragility and the g7+ group 
of fragile and conflict-affected states have come together to bring greater attention 
to the needs of fragile contexts at this critical time. We know that what works for 
countries in general often does not work for fragile contexts, necessitating specific 
approaches for these settings that need to be factored into global initiatives. Amid 
a growing focus on scaling energy access as a key component of resilient recovery 
efforts, we outline here the particular challenges and opportunities of fragile 
settings, and propose an approach to expanding energy access that works in these 
contexts.  
Energy has been a key enabler of social and economic development throughout 
history and constitutes a basic requirement of nearly all productive economic 
activity. The world has made great progress towards achieving universal energy 
access and UN Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7). Between 2010 and 2018, 
the share of the world population with access to electricity rose from 83% to 90%, 
representing over 400 million new connections.1 These gains have resulted from 
sustained commitments and fruitful cooperation among a diversity of stakeholders. 
Yet, a significant share of the world population still lags behind global progress 
in energy access. In 2018, of the over 800 million people in the world without 
access to electricity, 86% lived in countries characterised by the OECD as fragile 
(see Figure 1).2 Ensuring energy access in fragile countries is desirable for the 
positive impacts it has on social and economic development and environmental 
sustainability, but also because it is an essential element in creating the conditions 
needed to sustain peace, bring about stability, and escape fragility.   
While aspects of more conventional energy planning efforts remain possible in 
some fragile contexts, scaling energy access in many fragile settings requires a 
new approach that better accounts for the unique challenges of these contexts. 
Distributed generation technologies hold significant promise in this regard: they 
are resilient in the face of conflict and uncertainty and, if coupled with renewable 
energy solutions, are more sustainable for the planet. Additionally, the considerable 
progress made in improving quality and reducing costs of renewable energy 
technologies means that they are now the most cost-effective option in many 
instances. For the first time, we have a pivotal convergence in what is good for the 
climate, what is needed to unlock economic growth in fragile states, and what is 
technologically feasible. 
1 International Energy Agency et al, 2020.
2 Ibid.
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What do we mean by fragile contexts?
Fragility is caused by a variety of interlocking factors, and fragile 
contexts differ in the ways in which they are fragile. Common 
characteristics of fragility include “the lack of basic security, inadequate 
government capacity, the absence of a properly functioning private 
sector, and the presence of divided societies.”4 Increasingly, climate 
change and environmental destruction are driving fragility in countries 
across the world. 
A country affected by fragility is often not unstable or fragile across 
its whole territory. In many instances, fragility may be concentrated in 
certain areas, such as the periphery, natural resource rich regions, parts 
of the country afflicted by conflict, or regions most deeply impacted by 
environmental destruction and climate change. When we refer to ‘fragile 
contexts’, we specifically mean these sub-national areas most affected 
by fragility, rather than the entire country. 
We also recognise that fragility varies in severity. Our analysis and 
recommendations tend to focus on contexts of greater fragility, 
including those affected by conflict and violence, as less attention has 
been given to scaling energy access in these settings. 
3 World Bank, 2020a. 
4 LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018, p. 4.
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Investing in fragile contexts, with their higher perceived risks, more undeveloped 
markets, insufficient infrastructure, and constrained state capacity, remains difficult. 
But these challenges can be overcome through the concerted efforts of a range 
of stakeholders, including national governments, donors, development finance 
institutions, non-governmental organisations, and the private sector. Each of these 
entities can make specific contributions to joint efforts to expand energy access, and 
can leverage a range of innovative financing mechanisms and business models in this 
endeavour. 
2 Energy, development, and fragility
A critical relationship exists between energy poverty and fragility. Unequal access 
to natural resources and poor energy sector management can reduce trust and state 
legitimacy, hurt social cohesion, increase poverty, and cause or amplify tensions 
and conflict. State capacity and institutions are often weak in these contexts, 
governments lack the revenues to fund energy investments, poor maintenance can 
jeopardise reliable energy supply, and conflict can damage energy infrastructure. 
Resistance to state authority, either from armed opposition groups or citizens wary 
of government control extending into their communities, can also be a key obstacle. 
Energy poverty is a substantive element of the fragility trap: fragility hampers 
development, including gains in energy access, while the lack of development creates 
structural conditions for the persistence of fragility, social instability, and conflict. 
Consequently, overcoming the challenges of expanding energy access in fragile 
settings has the potential to contribute tangibly to moving these settings out of 
fragility. Access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy is crucial to catalyse 
social and economic development in least-developed countries and fragile settings. 
The far-reaching, positive impacts of ensuring energy access in fragile settings can 
be summarised as follows:
 — Productivity and growth: Poor access to energy is a major constraint to 
economic growth in many parts of the world. Energy access has the potential 
to support economic opportunities and movement into higher-productivity 
activities and sectors, driving structural transformation and lifting millions 
out of poverty.
 — Environmental sustainability: Three out of five people living in fragile 
contexts live in settings vulnerable to climate change.5 In the absence of 
affordable alternatives, some 2.7 billion people continue to rely on biomass 
(firewood and charcoal) for heating and cooking. Reliance on biomass has 
led to widespread deforestation, expansion of arid areas, and destruction 
of habitats and resources needed to support livelihoods. Fragile settings 
are bearing the brunt of climate change, which is compounding the many 
underlying vulnerabilities these settings face, such as land disputes and 
dependence on rain-fed agriculture, further aggravating existing dynamics 
of conflict, poverty, and weak governance. Scaling access to improved energy 
sources is vital to curb deforestation and mitigate the impacts of climate 
change. 
5 OECD, 2020a.
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 — Trust in the state: Because the consequences of expanding energy access are 
literally visible, and bring quick and concrete benefits, energy access plays an 
important role in reassuring citizens in fragile settings that their country is on 
a positive development trajectory. This has a tangible impact on building trust 
in the competency of governments and increasing state legitimacy, as well as 
strengthening security.6 Expanding energy access may also provide the quick 
wins needed to build momentum towards larger reforms. 
 — Peace dividend: In conflict-prone settings, creating jobs and supporting 
livelihoods directly and indirectly through investment in the energy sector 
enables a key peace dividend. Ensuring that people benefit more from 
stability than from conflict reduces citizens’ incentives to engage in violence 
and contributes to a more broad-based commitment to peace. Additionally, 
deploying renewable energy technology can support peacebuilding efforts, 
including by delivering short-term savings in humanitarian operations, while 
also comprising a longer-term building block for peace.7
 — Gender empowerment: Energy access can positively impact gender equality. 
It can reduce the time women (and children) spend collecting firewood 
for heating and cooking, and create income-generating opportunities 
for women, including activities that can be run from their homes. This is 
particularly important in contexts where walking long distances from home 
leaves women vulnerable to harassment, abduction, and rape, or where 
there are societal restrictions on women working outside the home.8 Surveys 
conducted in Chad’s Farchana refugee camp, for instance, report that 90% of 
confirmed incidents of rape occurred while women were collecting firewood.9 
Additionally, household air pollution caused by burning biomass fuels on 
inefficient stoves also disproportionately affects women, who do most of the 
cooking. Widespread adoption of improved energy sources for cooking has 
the potential to yield health benefits, particularly for women, and may give 
them greater control over financial resources.10   
 — Fiscal capacity: Government revenue can be raised through expanding energy 
access, mainly indirectly through its growth-enhancing impacts that can 
broaden the tax base and raise the productivity and profitability of firms. 
Higher revenue can, in turn, strengthen governments’ ability to deliver public 
services. 
6 Sacchetto et al., 2020.
7 Mozersky & Kammen, 2018.
8 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
9 Clean Cooking Alliance, 2019.
10 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
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“For the first time, we  
have a convergence 
in what is good for the 
climate, what is needed 
to unlock economic 
growth in fragile 
states, and what is 
technologically feasible”
Employees clean up solar panels which will be exported to Sudan at a factory on October 16, 2020 in Ji an, Jiangxi Province 
of China. Photo: by Deng Heping/VCG via Getty Images.
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3 Efforts to achieve energy access in 
fragile settings are off-track
Despite the critical importance of energy access and the remarkable progress 
towards global electrification since 2010, glaring disparities persist worldwide. In 
2018, almost 800 million people lacked access to electricity and 2.7 billion people 
did not have access to productive forms of energy.11
The greatest challenges converge in fragile countries, home to 86% of people with 
no access to electricity.12 Conditions are most extreme in highly vulnerable settings 
such as refugee camps, where it is estimated that nearly 90% of individuals have 
minimal access to energy and largely depend on traditional biomass for cooking 
and heating.13 Moreover, in stark contrast with global trends, energy access gaps 
in fragile environments are widening, as population growth outpaces the number 
of people that gain access to electricity, with an annual net increase of almost two 
million in the unconnected population in these settings.14 
National and international energy investment efforts are falling short of what is 
needed to close access gaps and achieve universal access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable, and modern energy by 2030, as required by SDG 7. It is estimated 
that the annual energy financing required to achieve these goals is just over US$ 
50 billion.15 However, at only US$ 30.2 billion, current global investment falls well 
below this threshold.16 Of this amount, a third targets new household connections, 
while the majority is channelled towards industrial and commercial uses. 
Although ODA spending in developing countries on energy as a whole, and 
renewable energy specifically, has been increasing over time, it has persistently 
favoured and become increasingly skewed towards non-fragile settings (see Figure 2 
and Figure 3). In 2018, ODA spending on energy (considered on a per capita basis) 
in non-fragile settings was nearly double that of fragile settings and almost four 
times higher than in extremely fragile locations.
In sub-Saharan Africa, home to more than half a billion people without access to 
electricity, annual investment is around US$ 9.6 billion, far short of the region’s US$ 
27 billion need.17 Despite their feasibility and value in fragile contexts, financial 
commitments in off-grid solutions in countries with the largest energy gaps – of 
which several are fragile – remains a staggeringly low 1.1% of the total finance 
for electricity, amounting to only US$ 460 million globally in 2018.18 These figures 
highlight clear shortcomings in the international energy financing architecture, both 
in terms of amounts mobilised and in geographic and technological focus.  
11 Global Commission to End Energy Poverty, 2019; Ayaburi et al, 2020.
12 International Energy Agency et al, 2020. See Annex 1 for further details.
13 Grafham & Lahn, 2015. 
14 International Energy Agency et al, 2020. 
15 International Energy Agency, 2018. 
16 Global Commission to End Energy Poverty, 2019.
17 Climate Policy Initiative & Sustainable Energy for All, 2019. 
18 Climate Policy Initiative & Sustainable Energy for All, 2020.
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Figure 2: Median per capita ODA flows towards developing 
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Figure 3: Median per capita ODA flows to developing countries on 
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19 OECD, 2020b. 
20 Ibid. 
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4 The current window of 
opportunity
COVID-19 in fragile contexts
Fragile settings have been hit particularly hard by the economic impacts of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Unprecedented declines in commodity prices, 
trade, and remittances, as well as reversals in capital flows, have triggered 
a collapse in earnings at the household, firm, and national levels. This has 
also exacerbated vulnerability to other shocks. Less developed countries tend 
to have large informal sectors where workers lack basic social protections, 
and responses to curbing the spread of the virus, such as lockdowns and 
restrictions on movement, have seen informal workers lose income and risk 
suffering long-term unemployment. The national governments of these 
countries are setting recovery packages in very difficult macro-fiscal contexts, 
with limited fiscal space and looming debt difficulties, especially for countries 
unable to borrow in their own currencies.
While COVID-19 has exposed many vulnerabilities and inequities in the 
world, it has also created an unprecedented window of opportunity to 
transform entrenched systems and shift towards more sustainable and 
equitable growth. Recovery from COVID-19 must be designed in a way 
that tackles underlying weaknesses and sets the course for long-term 
transformation to more resilient and inclusive growth and development. 
Scaling up energy investments can have a tangible impact on COVID-19 
recovery in fragile contexts: implementation can be undertaken quickly, is 
labour-intensive, generates immediate and visible benefits, and offers strong 
multiplier effects. These efforts have the potential to create jobs and promote 
social and economic recovery and resilience.21
Green energy as an effective and more affordable 
solution
Beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, the world faces two great global challenges 
today: poverty and climate change. There is an opportunity to make 
significant gains on both these fronts by driving a big push in expanding 
energy access to those most in need and transitioning to renewables as we 
do so. Indeed, a crucial element of meeting the goals of the Paris Climate 
Agreement and the SDGs will be transitioning the energy sector from 
dependence on fossil fuels to renewable energy sources.22 
Our ability to pursue a more sustainable path is made possible, in large 
part, by marked declines in the cost of renewable energy solutions in recent 
years due to technological improvements, greater economies of scale, more 
competitive supply chains, and strong firm-level know-how.23 In many parts of 
the world, renewables are now the most affordable energy option. Although 
21 g7+, 2020.
22 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
23 International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020a.
If previously fragile 
contexts could not 
afford to go green – 
now they cannot afford 
not to
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cost reductions have not been fully carried down to fragile contexts, progress is being 
made, and if previously fragile contexts could not afford to go green – now they cannot 
afford not to.
Figure 4: Global weighted average levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) 
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As renewable energy technologies go, solar PV holds the greatest potential for fragile 
contexts as:
 — A number of fragile countries hold some of the highest practical potential for 
solar PV (accounting for both solar resource and additional factors affecting PV 
conversion efficiency and basic land use constraints), or the output achievable by 
a PV system, in the world (see Figure 5).25 This makes investing in solar energy an 
especially promising opportunity in many fragile countries.
 — Solar PV is scalable. PV systems are modular and capacity can be incrementally 
increased over time through adding additional solar panels and/or batteries.26 
They can provide affordable electricity to remote, off-grid households at varying 
capacities. For instance, in East Africa, the off-grid, pay-as-you-go market is now 
able to offer systems in the 0–150-watt peak range that are attractively priced, 
often require no down-payment, and can run appliances such as radios and 
televisions; some higher-end options even support refrigerator-freezers.27 
24 Ibid.
25 Practical solar PV potential is the power output achievable by a typical PV system. 
It simulates the conversion of the available solar resource to electric power considering 
the impact of air temperature, terrain horizon, and albedo, as well as module tilt, 
configuration, shading, soiling, and other factors affecting system performance. 
26 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
27 Mozersky & Kammen, 2018.
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Cost reductions in renewable energy technologies
Between 2010 and 2019, the global weighted-average levelised cost 
of electricity of utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) fell by 82%, while 
that of concentrated solar power fell by 47%, onshore wind by 39% 
and offshore wind by 29%. For 56% of all newly commissioned utility-
scale renewable power generation capacity, the costs achieved in 2019 
were lower than the cheapest fossil fuel-fired option, demonstrating 
renewables’ ability to outcompete fossil fuels on cost.28 
While the greatest gains have been made in utility-scale technology, 
reductions have also been seen for smaller scale systems, with 
residential mini-grid costs declining between 42% and 79% over 
the 2010-2019 period, depending on the market.29 While distributed 
renewable technologies are quickly catching up with distributed 
fossil fuel solutions in terms of costs, the life costs of residential PV 
systems currently remain slightly higher than diesel (see Figure 4). Cost 
differences could also be larger depending on specific contexts and 
geographies, and switching costs would need to be considered as both 
households and firms may be more familiar with diesel generators. 
 — Renewables can now outcompete most fossil fuel options on cost, including 
for some distributed generation systems. Affordability considerations are 
all the more relevant in contexts suffering from high poverty incidence and 
low purchasing power.30 While grid-based electricity would generally be the 
cheapest choice, this option frequently does not exist in more fragile contexts. 
Households with solar lighting could save on average over US$ 60 per year 
and spend only 2% of their income on lighting, compared with spending 10% 
of their income for just four hours per day of illumination using kerosene, 
candle, or torch-light.31 
 — When coupled with battery storage systems, solar PV systems can provide a 
more reliable and uninterrupted supply, and can extend lighting and use of 
some appliances beyond daylight generation hours; however, battery storage 
facilities come at additional cost.
 — Solar mini-grids can be made to be compatible with the grid, should the 
grid ever extend to the area. Any surplus power generation achieved from 
mini-grids could thus theoretically be sold into the grid. This would enable 
communities or households to generate income while also lowering the need 
for governments to import electricity, thereby contributing to economic 
resilience at both the household and national level.
 — Of critical importance is the fact that renewable energy technologies 
lend themselves to distributed generation systems, which are the most 
appropriate energy systems for fragile settings, as detailed below.
28 International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020a.
29 Ibid.
30 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
31 Harrison et al, 2016.
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Figure 5: Global photovoltaic power potential32
While the cost of off-grid electrification solutions has come down significantly 
in recent years and novel business and financing models have proliferated, these 
options frequently remain too expensive for poor households and cannot be viable 
without donor support, government subsidies, or other interventions. International 
support and financing from a wide range of stakeholders – including private, 
development, and concessional finance – will be essential to enable any significant 
expansion in energy access in these settings. 
5 A different approach is needed for 
fragile settings
In many but not all instances, traditional power planning approaches have been of 
limited success in fragile contexts. They have occasionally failed spectacularly by not 
adequately taking into account a country’s context and social, political, and security 
dynamics. The risks of political instability, significant delays and cancellations in 
infrastructure projects, projects coming in at very high cost, or the risk of violence 
and damage can be rife in contexts of conflict or severe fragility, and security issues 
can significantly hamper, or make infeasible, the delivery of power system plans.33 
There is no established model for energy planning and infrastructure development 
in fragile contexts. What is feasible varies from country to country, as well as within 
countries, and planners must operate under radical uncertainty that cannot be 
quantified or easily incorporated into planning models. That said, there is evidence 
32 World Bank, 2019.
33 Bazilian & Logan, 2020.
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on what does and does not work in more fragile contexts – and this can form a solid 
basis for approaching energy access efforts in these settings.
Power planning in extreme fragility or conflict34
Conflict, in particular, makes power planning and infrastructure 
development very difficult and affects power system planning in specific 
ways, including:
 — Forced outages increase during conflict: Power system assets are 
frequent targets of attack; repair times increase due to site access 
problems, labour shortages, and unavailability of imported spare 
parts.
 — Fuel shortages increase during conflict, including as a result of 
deliberate attacks on fuel supply lines, and disruption of imports and 
transportation.
 — Cost changes are experienced due to currency depreciation and 
exchange rate fluctuation, unforeseen repair and maintenance costs, 
and the need for extra security measures.
 — Construction time is often prolonged by conflict due to problems 
importing equipment or recruiting workers, site access, sabotage, 
and suspension of funding.
More conventional energy planning may not work in 
fragile contexts
Large-scale, centralised energy infrastructures may not work well in some 
fragile contexts. Traditional least-cost planning models frequently tend toward 
the economies of scale offered by large-scale systems and produce plans that make 
technical and economic sense if projects can be financed, developed in a timely 
manner, and operated in a conventional way.35 However, this is often not possible 
in fragile contexts, where far greater uncertainty and risks abound. As a result, 
centralised grids may be problematic in fragile situations for a number of reasons:
 — They are vulnerable to disruption from physical damage caused by targeted 
attacks or as a by-product of wider conflict. Attacking infrastructure is a 
common practice in conflicts and electric power systems are obvious targets.36 
For example, after more than two years of violent civil war in Syria, more 
than 30 power stations were inactive and at least 40% of the country’s high 
voltage lines had been attacked, with the total value of damage to the energy 
sector estimated at $650-$800 million.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
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 — They are significantly more expensive to build, and governments of fragile 
countries generally lack the resources needed to fund these large-scale 
projects. They also take many years to complete, during which time millions 
of people may remain without electricity access. 
 — They are inherently more dependent on functioning government systems 
and institutions, as well as some level of political and social stability – 
factors which are often absent in fragile contexts.37
 — Concentration of power generation also means that control of the grid is 
similarly concentrated, predisposing centralised grid systems to corruption.38
 — They run the risk of becoming stranded assets. For example, Pakistan’s 
latest long-term power capacity plan, the Indicative Generation Capacity 
Expansion Plan 2047 demonstrates overcapacity and stranded coal and LNG 
plants by 2030.
 — Significant rural to urban migration in many fragile countries, as rural 
inhabitants seek greater safety and better economic opportunities in urban 
areas, reduces the relative size and concentration of rural populations. This is 
likely to lower rural demand for energy, reducing the financial feasibility of 
extending grids into many rural areas. 
 — Large-scale energy projects can ignite discontent and tensions in 
already fragile locations by causing the forced displacement of vulnerable 
populations, ecological disruption, and negative impacts on livelihoods. 
The transnational aspect of natural resources can also have implications 
for geopolitical equilibria.39 For instance, disputes have intensified between 
Ethiopia on one side and Egypt and Sudan on the other over the filling of 
Ethiopia’s US$ 4.5 billion hydroelectric Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. 
The dam will reduce the flow of Blue Nile waters to Sudan and Egypt, 
where food security and livelihoods of millions of people are dependent on 
agriculture supported by the Nile. Ethiopia’s continued action despite a lack 
of agreement on an acceptable rate of filling the dam is destabilising regional 
dynamics.40
A new approach for fragile contexts
New planning methods that explicitly recognise the risks inherent in fragile 
contexts and integrate them into planning tools are needed to support flexible and 
incremental options that prioritise resiliency in settings of severe insecurity.41 
Distributed generation technologies show much potential: they are more resilient 
in the face of fragility and conflict and, importantly, have considerable synergies 
37 Bazilian & Logan, 2020.
38 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
39 Morris, 2017.
40 Walsh, 2020.
41 Bazilian & Logan, 2020.
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with renewable energy solutions. Distributed generation systems offer the 
following benefits in fragile settings; they:42
 — Mitigate risk as they reduce reliance on a small number of large generators 
and on the transmission and distribution grid; they spatially distribute risk 
and lower the risk of failure.
 — Can use locally available renewable energy sources, which reduces 
dependency on import and transportation of fossil fuels.
 — Allow for a diversified energy supply, increasing resilience. 
 — Are feasible in contexts of low state institutional and fiscal capacity. They 
can be managed and operated by households, communities, or private firms, 
lowering demands on government capacity. 
 — Are modular, flexible, and less capital-intensive, making them easier and 
quicker to roll out and manage in unpredictable, conflict-prone settings. 
Robust decision-making favours options that perform equally well across a range 
of plausible futures. For example, stand-alone systems like mini-grids work alone 
and could also be engineered to be compatible with the grid if and when it arrives.43
Data-driven decision-making is important in these contexts, where conflict and 
fragility intensity, location, and dynamics change over time. Energy planning 
approaches must have adaptive strategies that collect data on these and other 
changes, acknowledge improvement or deterioration in conditions in all or part of 
the country, and adjust management decisions accordingly. Given the often-complex 
reality on the ground, innovative data collection approaches that eliminate the need 
for on-the-ground collection, such as use of satellite images, would be beneficial in 
contexts of conflict or extreme fragility. 
Incorporating a conflict or fragility lens into models. This brings critical 
information on the impact that conflict or fragility may have on the project and that 
the project may have on conflict or fragility into the decision-making process, and 
prompts consideration of appropriate mitigation measures.44 Conflict-specific risks 
that have to be factored in would include, for example, the possibility that readily 
portable distributed generation technologies could be removed and potentially 
support illicit activities or black market economies.
For the reasons above, solar PV mini-grids and off-grid solutions appear to hold the 
greatest promise to expand energy access in very fragile situations. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that solar PV has made successful inroads even in conflict situations. For 
example, war-torn Yemen has shown unexpected improvements in energy access 
during conflict due to greater use of solar power at the household level.45
42 Sacchetto et al, 2020; Bazilian & Logan, 2020.
43 Bazilian & Logan, 2020.
44 Ibid.
45 Al-Akwaa, 2019.
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Solar PV mini-grids
The specific considerations of fragile settings suggest that mini-grids 
(or smaller micro-grids or nano-grids) are the most promising solution 
for very fragile contexts. A mini-grid is “a set of small-scale electricity 
generators and possibly energy storage systems interconnected to a 
distribution network that supplies electricity to a small, localised group 
of customers and operates independently from the national transmission 
grid.”46 
Mini-grids can be powered by diesel or various renewable options (solar 
PV, wind, hydro), or can be diesel-renewable hybrids. Solar PV appears 
to have the greatest potential given the geographic location and 
climate of many fragile countries, as well as a lower land requirement 
which minimises population displacement and security of land tenure 
concerns.
Mini-grids can serve a collection of households or commercial 
businesses, and can also support some productive activities such as 
irrigation and grinding mills. The mini-grid structure would also integrate 
well with a usage-based pay-as-you-go (PAYG) model, ensuring greater 
reliability of payment for services.
Additional considerations
There are several additional considerations that should be taken into account when 
planning energy access expansion in fragile contexts, including:
 — The effect of decentralisation of energy generation on political dynamics. 
Decentralisation is often fiercely resisted by central governments that see it 
as a loss of central control and, in some cases, empowerment of opposition 
groups. Armed opposition groups and citizens wary of state expansion 
into their communities may also resist efforts. Therefore, depending on the 
political context, citizens may perceive decentralisation of energy generation 
as either strengthening or weakening political stability or national sentiment. 
Additionally, where renewable energy technologies are not equally feasible 
across all fragile areas in a country, questions of fairness and preferential 
treatment of some groups will likely arise. Any efforts to scale energy access 
in fragile contexts will therefore need to factor in the particular dynamics of a 
region and work closely with all stakeholders.
 — Fragile contexts require energy in different forms and hybrid solutions are 
needed. While solar PV generates energy for the very important purposes 
of lighting and powering some appliances in households, it is not an energy 
access panacea for either urban or rural areas. Although solar PV can support 
some productive uses, including irrigation, it is not sufficient to power 
heavier industry and has not yet offered adequate cooking solutions, which 
necessitates hybrid systems. Grid or larger-scale off-grid options would be 
46 African Development Bank, n.d.
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needed to support most industrial activity, and grid developments should 
be prioritised accordingly. For cooking, switching household use away from 
biomass to liquified petroleum gas (LPG) or liquified natural gas (LNG) 
is vital to curb the massive deforestation occurring in many energy poor 
environments. Widespread adoption of LPG or LNG for cooking will require 
better affordability, accessibility, and reliability of supply of these energy 
sources, as well as behavioural change in households, an aspect that has 
proved to be difficult and will need behavioural and policy nudges to achieve.
 — Expanding distributed technologies may reduce government incentives 
to extend grid connection. Adoption of off-grid systems would satisfy some 
energy demand and lower the financial viability of grid extension, particularly 
into rural areas. In contexts where citizens would prefer grid connection and 
there is a feasible likelihood of grid extension, they may resist the roll-out 
of off-grid alternatives, seeing it as potentially weakening governments’ 
incentives to extend the grid.
 — Maintenance and replacement of equipment: Ongoing maintenance 
services and equipment repair and replacement costs must be factored into 
energy access initiatives. These aspects are often overlooked, with the result 
that households do not extract optimal benefit from these systems and may 
become unwilling to pay for services. Capabilities of PV panels and batteries 
decline over time and this equipment needs to be replaced every few years, 
highlighting the need for replacement parts to be easily available.
 — Securing payment from customers: Willingness and ability to pay must be 
considered and projects structured to ensure payment. 
 — Despite the obvious benefits of both solar PV and LPG/LNG, the 
willingness of customers to pay for these energy sources has consistently 
been far lower than their cost. This raises questions around whether a lack 
of knowledge of the benefits of energy access or problems around system 
performance or availability of repair and replacement services are lowering 
willingness to pay, and if these problems could be addressed through 
appropriate interventions. 
 — The PAYG business model holds promise in ensuring customer payment for 
energy used. Usage-based PAYG models consist of solar PV systems that 
function upon customers loading money (equivalent to a given amount of 
kilowatt-hours) onto pre-paid meters. Once the amount of electricity paid 
for has been used up, the system ceases to function until a new payment 
is made. In lease-to-own PAYG models, customers pay for the cost of the 
entire energy system through a set of instalments over time. 
 — The relatively high upfront costs of distributed renewable energy systems 
pose an obstacle to adoption and necessitate potentially rebalancing costs 
for customers by lowering upfront costs (such as equipment or connection 
costs) and raising variable costs (such as usage tariffs).
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“Scaling up energy 
investments can have 
a tangible impact on 
COVID-19 recovery 
in fragile contexts: 
implementation can be 
undertaken quickly”
Diki Sherpa props her solar collectors against a fence as soon as the sun breaks over the neighbouring mountains in this 
small outpost along the Sandakphu Trail, one of the most popular trekking routes in West Bengal. The trail follows the 
mountain ridge that defines the border between India and Nepal in this region. The town has no power but for solar panels 
and no firewood for heating homes as the Nepal side of the trail has been denuded of trees, and the Indian side is Singalila 
National Park, where cutting is strictly prohibited. Photo: Jerry Redfern/LightRocket via Getty Images.
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6 Constraints to scaling energy 
investments in fragile environments
There are a number of constraints to scaling energy investments in fragile settings, 
and these constraints affect different energy projects to varying extents. While 
larger-scale energy projects face greater difficulties, some of the constraints of 
distributed and smaller-scale projects may be easier to navigate. 
Limited state capacity
Limited state capacity has been a major roadblock preventing progress in expanding 
energy access for decades. Governments in fragile settings tend to have limited 
capacity to undertake key activities in the power planning and investment process, 
including longer-term planning, project appraisal, and structuring energy projects to 
optimise outcomes. Short-term political objectives also often take precedence over 
and undermine longer-term planning efforts.
State capacity is not, however, a prerequisite for energy investments; efforts to 
advance energy access and develop state capacity can be undertaken simultaneously 
and are mutually reinforcing.47 The private sector could also play a role in expanding 
existing capacity if they are included in planning phases in addition to their role 
as investors and implementers in later project phases. Importantly, a distributed 
generation approach would have a lower state capacity burden than larger-scale, 
centralised projects, further easing this constraint. 
Severely undeveloped energy markets
There are pronounced challenges in fragile situations that prevent investors from 
entering undeveloped energy markets at scale:
 — Disproportionately high project preparation costs: Undeveloped markets 
require considerable upstream and project preparation work before projects 
can be realised. The cost of project preparation can constitute 3-10% of the 
capital cost of projects and can run over several years.
 — Small investment ticket sizes mean that overheads constitute a larger 
proportion of project costs. Together with high project preparation costs, this 
makes it difficult for investments to break even, let alone achieve profitability.
 — Poor credit worthiness of utility companies is frequently an issue in poorer 
countries and can be a problem when utility companies are off-takers in 
larger-scale energy projects. Structuring projects to ensure that investors can 
collect income is critical as it will ultimately determine whether a project will 
be invested in. Assistance from more creditworthy intermediary off-takers or 
power trading companies may be essential.
47 Sacchetto et al, 2020.
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 — Credit constraints tend to be severe in fragile settings and funding from 
foreign sources is frequently essential to finance projects. However, risk 
premia attached to fragile contexts makes funding from foreign private 
investors more expensive. 
 — Land issues often arise in land-intensive energy projects, including larger-
scale renewable projects, especially when some degree of population 
displacement is necessary or land ownership is contested. Investors also need 
to feel assured of the security of land tenure in order to make investments in 
immovable infrastructure. 
 — Due diligence requirements are more difficult to fulfil in fragile situations 
where there is frequently a lack of transparency regarding information on 
local individuals and firms. Due diligence requirements are made considerably 
more burdensome if there are sanctions of any type against the country or 
certain named individuals.
 — Political instability dissuades investments or lending for more than relatively 
short periods of time, which makes it difficult for borrowers to use credit for 
productive, longer-term investments.
 — Currency risk is often a critical issue in fragile contexts, particularly where 
governments cannot borrow in their own currency. Exchange rate fluctuations 
mean project costs often increase, and depreciation of local currency against 
the US$ makes it more expensive for borrowers to repay loans. To address 
this, currency risk management instruments have been developed, but they 
need to be reasonably priced for fragile contexts for investors to make greater 
use of them. 
 — Bureaucratic processes mean it is often essential to have a project champion 
with the political clout to help investors overcome obstacles they face, 
including ensuring that decisions are made in a timely manner. 
Financing
While in some developing country contexts, a lack of bankable projects may be a 
more pressing constraint than finance, finance is certainly a bottleneck in fragile 
settings, even for relatively small projects, due to excessive perceived risk and 
uncertain returns. Specific global effort is needed to unlock energy finance to enable 
investments in those locations where energy gaps are greatest. 
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7 What needs to be done
New commitments and partnerships are needed to catalyse funding for energy 
investments in fragile contexts. Key stakeholders in financing efforts include: 
 — Donors: Donor funding (bilateral, multilateral, philanthropic) will be 
essential, at least in the short- to medium-term. Donors have a key role to 
play in mobilising financing through new and existing facilities and injecting 
funding into multilateral development banks to increase their lending 
capability. These entities have funding that can accept lower returns than 
private investors demand, allowing them to take on a uniquely important role 
in energy expansion efforts in fragile contexts. 
 — Development finance institutions (DFIs): DFIs have a critical role to play 
in making catalytic investments that have the potential to support the 
development of a pipeline of bankable projects, achieve improvements in the 
regulatory and enabling environments, and facilitate private investors entering 
these challenging contexts on de-risked terms. The upstream work required 
to develop bankable projects is costly, and if these costs are added onto 
individual projects, they sink otherwise promising projects. A different way to 
finance this work is therefore needed. 
The most promising route is for DFIs to use aid funding to cover the costs of 
project preparation and de-risking, leveraging their ability to accept lower 
rates of return to take on investments that others cannot make. By doing 
this, DFIs could bring private investors in on terms that only need de-risked 
capital, making private investment in these contexts far more feasible. If used 
strategically to crowd in private investment, aid funding can have an outsized 
impact by reaching greater scale through private sector participation. The 
public good nature and desirable impacts of greater energy access in fragile 
environments make a strong case for development agencies to subsidise these 
investments. 
DFIs could also potentially play a valuable coordinating role to facilitate 
the movement of multiple energy companies into a fragile country at the 
same time. Experience has shown that foreign firms are more likely to enter 
a challenging environment if they are not going alone, particularly if they 
are moving with their suppliers, as this reduces the individual risk faced by 
each firm. However, this simultaneous market entry does not happen without 
careful coordination and support – a role DFIs are well placed to play. 
 — Private sector: The financial resources, expertise, and management efficiency 
of the private sector are crucial for sufficient scale to be reached in these 
efforts. However, private investors often do not consider infrastructure 
investments in fragile contexts and when they do, they typically require high 
rates of return (generally exceeding 10-12%) to compensate for perceived 
or actual risks.48 There are few projects where such rates are feasible, 
especially when taking into account the additional costs of operating in these 
environments. Even if energy was generated under these terms, it would make 
48 Infrastructure funds in Europe attract internal rates of return in region of 12% 
(Deloitte, 2016), so can extrapolate above this for fragile contexts. 
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the cost of energy far too high, placing energy access beyond the reach of a 
majority of people in these countries. 
What is needed are partnerships and financial arrangements that will allow 
private investors to participate on de-risked terms. If commercially acceptable 
returns can be attained through the roll-out of new financing mechanisms, 
financial sustainability of efforts is possible and private sector participation 
would enable greater scale to be achieved. 
Innovative financing instruments and business models should be leveraged. A 
range of these are already in use and their terms can be further tailored to meet the 
needs of fragile settings.
 — Grant and blended finance: A lack of long-term, risk-tolerant capital at 
affordable rates prevents businesses from scaling up in fragile settings. Given 
the desirable social and economic benefits generated by energy investments, 
the donor and international finance community should leverage grant or 
blended finance targeting early-stage project phases, focusing on projects 
where this financing is most additional. This would improve the viability 
of investment opportunities and ready them to tap into larger commercial 
financial markets at later stages.
 — Currency risk management instruments: Local currency instability is a 
factor determining high investment risk and driving underinvestment in 
fragile settings. Instruments have been developed to address this risk and are 
available to investors seeking to enter fragile contexts. However, it is vital that 
they are affordably priced for fragile settings to ensure greater investor use.
 — Political Risk Insurance (PRI): Political risk, such as war, asset expropriation, 
contractual breach, or prohibitions on exports, is a deterrent to investment 
in fragile settings. PRI protects against investment losses that may result 
from these events. However, PRI remains limited or prohibitively expensive 
in fragile contexts and is generally only made available to foreign investors. 
Between 2010 and 2019, only 10% or an average of US$353 million annually 
of the new guarantee volume of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was in fragile contexts.49 Efforts to scale up 
PRI and to also provide cover for domestic investors could be effective in 
encouraging greater investment in fragile markets. Multilateral institutions 
such as MIGA are best placed to undertake this as they can assume greater 
risk than private insurers, offer longer tenure of coverage and lower and 
more constant premiums, and can use their institutional influence to mitigate 
disputes between government and investors.50 
 — Pay-as-you-go payment solutions: These have already been pioneered for 
distributed solar PV and cleaner cooking technologies, and building on these 
platforms could unlock additional private capital for energy expansion in 
fragile settings. Securing payment directly from customers is straightforward 
with mini-grid solutions and can help avoid issues of non-payment from 
utilities or larger off-takers that arise when selling power into the grid. 
49 World Bank, 2020b.
50 Mayer, 2018.
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The national governments of fragile states have an important role to play in 
supporting scaling of distributed generation technologies. In addition to building 
state capacity and working to address the weaknesses posed by very undeveloped 
markets, including energy markets, in their countries, governments can drive efforts 
in the following ways:
 — Developing regulatory frameworks to support energy investments, including 
enabling private ownership and operation of distributed generation systems 
and developing national programmes for mini-grids. 
 — Committing to transparency and upholding the rule of law to build a safer 
environment for investors as a way to lower risk premia and create a more 
attractive environment for investment and private sector development. 
 — Introducing financial incentives to encourage adoption of renewable energy 
technologies or make scale-up of efforts more financially feasible, such as 
lowering import tariffs on renewable energy assets.
 — Enabling interconnection by facilitating technical and legal procedures 
governing connecting mini-grids to the national electricity grid, and be willing 
to purchase excess generation from households and communities.
 — Leading by example by adopting distributed renewable generation systems 
for use in public buildings such as schools, clinics, and government office 
buildings.51
Strengthening government capacity in the energy sector is crucial. Multilateral 
and bilateral development agencies should support the strengthening of government 
capacity in fragile states, including for energy planning, project appraisal, and 
project implementation. Improving government capacity to take on greater 
responsibilities as well as deepening local workforce capabilities in the energy sector 
is key for sustainability. Peer learning among fragile countries has proven to be an 
effective form of cooperation and should be supported as well.
51 Energy.gov, n.d.
Yemenis look at solar 
panels displayed during a 
fair for solar technology 
and alternative energy 
on February 23, 2016 at 
Sana’a’s university. 
Photo: Mohammed Huwais/
AFP via Getty Images
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52 OECD, 2018.
53 We have tried to ensure the accuracy of data on energy access by country 
and have used the World Bank’s Tracking SDG 7.1.1 Electrification Dataset, but we 
recognise that there may be inconsistencies between various data sources.
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